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Abstract
I study money creation in versions of the Trejos-Wright (1995)
and Shi (1995) models with indivisible money and bounded individ-
ual holdings. I work with the same class of policies as in Deviatov and
Wallace (2001), who study money creation in that model. However,
I consider two alternative notions of implementability – the ex ante
pairwise core and the ex post pairwise core. I compute a set of nu-
merical examples to determine whether money creation is beneﬁcial
in my model. I ﬁnd that if the ex post pairwise core is the notion
of implementability, then examples where money creation is beneﬁ-
cial are easily found, while I ﬁnd no such examples if the notion of
implementability is the ex ante pairwise core.
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11 Introduction
A minimum test for the usefulness of a monetary model seems to be its abil-
ity to study lump-sum money creation. Among such models there seems to
be a sharp contrast in results depending on whether there is heterogeneity
in asset holdings. Representative agent models tend to yield results which
are in line with what has become known as the Friedman rule: the opti-
mal monetary policy is not creation, but destruction ﬁnanced by lump-sum
taxes. Models which make use of heterogeneity do not give a general answer:
in some of these models the optimal monetary policy is contractionary, in
some other models it is expansionary. Examples of models where it is ex-
pansionary include Imrohoroglu (1992), Levine (1991) and a generalization
by Kehoe, Levine and Woodford (1992), Molico (1997) and Deviatov and
Wallace (2001).
Although these settings diﬀer in details, in all of them one role of money is
to provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks faced by the agents. Thus,
Imrohoroglu (1992) is an income shock model; Levine (1991) and Kehoe,
Levine and Woodford (1992) use a preference shock model; Molico (1997)
and Deviatov and Wallace (2001) work with the random matching model
of Trejos-Wright (1995) and Shi (1995). In the latter setting, idiosyncratic
uncertainty takes the form of potentially long runs of production and con-
sumption opportunities.
In all of these models, there is a potentially beneﬁcial role for expansion-
ary policy. An expansionary policy, consisting of equal per capita lump-sum
transfers, reduces the dispersion in money holdings of individuals. Because
it may be hard to get trades to occur between rich producers and poor con-
sumers, the reduction in dispersion may be beneﬁcial. If the parameters fall
into the right region (e.g. as in Deviatov and Wallace (2001) if individu-
als are patient enough), this beneﬁcial external margin eﬀect outweighs the
usual harmful internal margin eﬀect of money creation.
An important diﬀerence among these models is that they use diﬀerent
notions of implementable outcomes. Imrohoroglu (1992), Levine (1991) and
Kehoe, Levine and Woodford (1992) use competitive outcomes; Molico (1997)
uses a particular bargaining solution; Deviatov and Wallace (2001) allow for
any outcome which satisﬁes ex post individual rationality in meetings.
Here I study the model used in Deviatov and Wallace (2001). However, I
work with two alternative notions of implementability – the ex post pairwise
core and the ex ante pairwise core. The core restrictions (as opposed to
2individual rationality alone) allow to eliminate outcomes which are subject
to defections by pairs in meetings. Because closed-form solutions cannot be
obtained, I proceed numerically.
My main ﬁnding is that the choice of a notion of implementability seems
to matter: if the ex post pairwise core is the notion of implementability,
then there are examples where money creation is beneﬁcial; if the ex ante
pairwise core is the notion of implementability, then there seem to be no such
examples. This second result is striking because it stands in contrast with a
long list of examples (above) where money creation is beneﬁcial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe
the environment; in section 3 I deﬁne implementable allocations; in section 4
I discuss some general properties of implementable allocations; in section 5 I
describe the algorithm; in section 6 I discuss examples; section 7 concludes.
2 Environments
The background environment is a simple random matching model of money
due to Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). Time is discrete and the
horizon is inﬁnite. There are N ≥ 3 perishable consumption goods at each
date and a [0,1] continuum of each of N types of agents. A type n person
consumes only good n and produces good n +1(modulo N). Each person
maximizes expected discounted utility with discount parameter β ∈ (0,1).
Utility in a period is given by u(y)−c(x),w h e r ey denotes consumption and
x denotes production of an individual (x,y ∈ R+).T h ef u n c t i o nu is strictly
concave, strictly increasing and satisﬁes u(0) = 0,w h i l et h ef u n c t i o nc is
convex with c(0) = 0 and is strictly increasing. Also, there exists ˆ y>0 such
that u(ˆ y)=c(ˆ y). In addition, u and c are twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
At each date, each agent meets one other person at random.
There is only one asset in this economy which can be stored across periods:
ﬁat money. This money is indivisible and no individual can have more than
B units of money at any given time, where 2 ≤ B<∞. Agents cannot
commit to future actions (except commitment to outcomes of randomized
trades when the ex ante pairwise core notion of implementability is assumed).
Finally, each agent’s specialization type and individual money holdings are
observable within each meeting, but the agent’s history, except as revealed
by money holdings, is private.
33 Implementable allocations and the optimum
problem
The pairwise meetings, the inability to commit, the privacy of individual his-
tories, and the perishable nature of the goods imply that any production must
be accompanied by a positive probability of receiving money. In every meet-
ing of a potential producer with i units of money and a potential consumer
with j units, there is a set, denoted Kij, of feasible money transfers from the
consumer to the producer, transfers which are consistent with each person’s
money holdings being in the set {0,1,...,B}: Kij = {0,1,...min(j,B − i)}.
A trade meeting is one where K
+
ij ≡ Kij\{0} is nonempty. For each trade
meeting between a producer with i and a consumer with j units of money,
trade is represented by a probability measure µij on R+×K ij with the inter-
pretation that if (y,k) is randomly drawn in accordance with µij,t h e n(y,k)
i st h es u g g e s t e dt r a d ei nt h a tm e e t i n g .L e tµ be the collection of measures
µij corresponding to trade meetings.
For any measure µij it is convenient to consider the collection of condi-
tional measures µk
ij(A)=µij(A|k), k ∈ Kij, and their supports Ωk
ij.1 Then






ij(A),w h e r eλ
k
ij ≡ µij(Ωk
ij),i st h e
probability that k u n i t so fm o n e ya r eo ﬀered in a meeting. Finally, let pi
b et h ef r a c t i o no fa g e n t si ne a c hs p e c i a l i z a t i o nt y p ew h os t a r tad a t ew i t h
i units of money and let p =( p0,...,pB). Then, in terms of pi and λ
k
ij,a n




















where πmn is the probability of a trade that results in transition from having
m units of money to having n units. Note that since T is a transition matrix,




In addition to trades there is lump-sum money creation. I use the same
kind of policy that was studied by Deviatov and Wallace (2001). The policy
1Recall that if µ is a probability measure, the support of µ, denoted suppµ,i st h e
smallest closed set A such that µ(A)=1 .
4is a probabilistic version of the proverbial helicopter drops of money. The
timing of events in a period is the following. First there are meetings and
trades. Next, each person receives one unit of money with probability α.
(Those who are at the upper bound and receive a unit must discard it.)
Then each unit of money disintegrates with probability δ.
This policy has a close resemblance with the standard policy (expansion
at a rate) which is followed by proportional reduction (normalization, see
e.g. Lucas and Woodford (1994)) in individual holdings. The standard policy
shifts the distribution of money holdings towards the mean and makes money
less desirable to acquire because poor producers are less willing to produce for
money (because they get a transfer without production) and rich consumers
are more willing to part with money (because they lose some of its value).
The (α,δ)-policy of Deviatov and Wallace (2001) has these eﬀects as well.
Similar to trades, creation and destruction parts of the policy yield a pair
of transition matrices for money holdings, denoted A and D respectively.
According to my description of the policy, A is a two-diagonal matrix where
the probability of getting a unit of money, α,i sn e x tt oa n da b o v et h em a i n
diagonal, and the probability of getting no transfer, 1 − α,i so nt h em a i n
diagonal. Matrix D is lower-triangular where the ﬁrst i entries in the i-th






1 − α, if j = i










i−j(1 − δ)j, if j ≤ i
0, otherwise
The stationarity requirement is pTAD= p.
It is convenient to express individual rationality and pairwise core con-
straints in terms of discounted expected utilities. For an allocation (p,µ,α,δ),
that is stationary, discounted expected utility of an agent who ends up with
i units of money at the end of the period, denoted vi, is constant. Then vec-






































5and where l ∈ {0,...,B}. Note that an individual with no money can only
expect to be a producer, an agent with B units can only be a consumer, and
anyone else can be either a consumer or a producer.
Because T, A,a n dD are transition matrices and β ∈ (0,1),t h em a p p i n g
G(x) ≡ β(q0+TADx0) is a contraction. Therefore, (2) has a unique solution














ij(y,k) ≡ (ei+k − ei)ADv
0 − c(y) (5)
be the gain from trade of y units of output for k units of money for the




ij(y,k) ≡ (ej−k − ej)ADv
0 + u(y) (6)
be the gain from the same trade for the consumer (where el is the B +1 -
































be the expected (before the realization (y,k) from measure µij is announced
to trading parties) gains from trade in that meeting.
The ex ante pairwise core notion of implementability gives rise to the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. An allocation (p,µ,α,δ) is called ex ante pairwise core




ij ≥ 0 and Π
c
ij ≥ 0 (7)
hold for all i and j, and (iv) there exists a vector θ ∈ [0,1]B2 such that for












6where the value function, v, is taken as given.
The ex post pairwise core notion yields the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. An allocation (p,µ,α,δ) is called ex post pairwise core
implementable if conditions (i) and (ii) in Deﬁnition 1 hold and if (iii) pipj >
0 and (y,k) ∈ suppµij imply
Π
p
ij(y,k) ≥ 0 and Π
c
ij(y,k) ≥ 0,
and (iv) pipj > 0 implies that there does not exist a pair (y0,k 0) such that for














where at least one of the inequalities is strict.
Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 say that an allocation is implementable if (i) it is
stationary, (ii) satisﬁes free disposal of money, (iii) satisﬁes individual ratio-
nality, and (iv) there is no incentive for defections by pairs in meetings.
Finally, our optimum problem is to maximize ex ante utility. That is,
the optimum problem, denoted P,i st oc h o o s e(p,µ,α,δ) from among those
that are implementable to maximize pv0 ≡ W.
It is useful to express the objective W in terms of returns. If I multiply




























where z(y) ≡ u(y) −c(y). As one would expect, because for every consumer
there is a producer, welfare is equal to the net expected discounted utility in
all trade meetings.
74 General results
In their paper on lotteries, Berentsen, Molico and Wright (2002) give a com-
plete characterization of the ex ante pairwise core for the case of one-unit
bound on holdings. Here I use their results to show that every ex ante pair-
wise core implementable allocation has no randomization over output; each
conditional measure µk
ij is degenerate and does not depend on k. The proof is
the same as that of Proposition 3 in Berentsen, Molico and Wright (2002), so
I do not reproduce it here. Degeneracy follows immediately from concavity
of u(x) and −c(x). Independence on k follows from concavity of the Nash
product (8) in Deﬁnition 1.
Degeneracy of conditional measures implies that the optimum problem P
is ﬁnite dimensional. This allows me to characterize the ex ante pairwise core
in terms of the necessary ﬁrst order conditions for maximization of the Nash
product. Because of concavity of the latter these necessary conditions are
also suﬃcient. If an allocation (p,µ,α,δ) has yij > 0 in all trade meetings,2























for all pairs (i,j) corresponding to trade meetings and transfers of positive
amounts of money k,w h e r eλ
k







The ﬁrst order conditions (10) yield a set of constraints which an ex
ante pairwise core implementable allocation must satisfy in addition to the
participation constraints in Deﬁnition 1. If the value function ADv0 implied
by an implementable allocation (p,µ,α,δ) is strictly concave, then (10) has
implications for the level of output in some meetings. In particular, if λ
k
ij > 0
and k ≥ j − i for some k ∈ K
+
ij,t h e nyij ≤ y∗, the unconstrained maximizer
of z(y).3 In the examples below, B =2 , so the only meetings in which output
can exceed y∗ are those between a producer with zero and a consumer with
two units of money.
2As u ﬃcient condition for this is that ADv0,w h e r ev is the value function implied
by an implementable allocation (p,µ,α,δ), is strictly increasing and that u0(0) = ∞ and
c0(0) = 0.
3Notice that if j ≥ i − 1, that is if the producer’s holdings are one unit less than the
consumer’s or larger, then trade implies λ
k
ij > 0 for some k ≥ j − i.
8If the ex post pairwise core is the notion of implementability, then degen-
eracy of conditional measures µk
ij is less straightforward.4 One conceivable
approach to establishing degeneracy is to replace any nondegenerate distrib-
ution over output by its mean. While this would increase the objective (9),
because it is concave, it is not evident how to show that such a non-local
alternative also satisﬁes the ex post pairwise core restrictions. Therefore, I
develop a local argument. First, I devise a way to perturb measures µk
ij in
terms of a few parameters. The perturbation adjusts the endpoints of the
support and creates an atom or adjusts any that exist. Second, in order to
carry out the perturbations and to invoke the Kuhn-Tucker theorem’s nec-
essary conditions, the allocations under consideration have to be internal.
This requirement forces me to consider a subset of allocations, those I call
connected. Because this is a proper subset of all ex post pairwise core im-
plementable allocations, I also have to argue that it is plausible that the
optimum over the larger set is in fact connected.
The formal deﬁnition of connectedness is somewhat lengthy and may be
diﬃcult to follow at ﬁrst. Roughly speaking, it requires that an allocation
implies a value function consistent with a willingness to trade one unit of
money in a suﬃcient number of meetings. Here willingness does not require
that actual trades involve transfers of one unit of money, but only that trades
of one unit satisfy the participation constraints implied by the allocation. A
suﬃcient number of meetings means that these meetings can be linked into
a chain that covers the entire set of money holdings. Here, by describing
simple suﬃcient conditions for connectedness, I suggest that adding the con-
nectedness requirement is likely to be innocuous for problem P.
Given the form of the objective (9), one would expect that any solutions
to problem P would have trade in many meetings. But, requiring trade in
all trade meetings is too restrictive; it may be hard to get trades between
poor consumers and rich producers. Fortunately, that is not necessary for
4One can obtain three diﬀerent characterizations of the optima which are useful in the
computation of examples. First, because the meetings are pairwise, it suﬃces to consider
allocations which have two-point-support conditional measures over output. If B is the
bound on money holdings, this leads to a 4M +B +2dimensional optimization problem,
where M ≡ 1
6B(B +1 ) ( 2 B +1 ) . Alternatively, if free disposal of goods in meetings is
allowed, then it is easily shown that randomization over output is not needed. In that case
the dimensionality of the problem is 3M + B +2 . Degeneracy result reduces it further to
2M + B +2dimensions. The reduction is proportional to the cube of the bound and is,
therefore, signiﬁcant.
9connectedness. Instead, the following is suﬃcient: (i) (p,µ,α,δ) implies a
concave value function v and p has full support; and (ii) trade occurs in all
meetings where the consumer is at least as rich as the producer. It is plausible
that solutions to problem P satisfy (i) and (ii) and, hence, are connected.5
I use connectedness to show that every optimum over the set of ex post IR
implementable (conditions (i)-(iii) in Deﬁnition 2) and connected allocations
has degenerate measures µk
ij. Then, addition of the ex post pairwise core
restrictions (condition (iv) in Deﬁnition 2) does not enlarge the set of feasible
outcomes which implies that every optimum over the set of ex post pairwise
core implementable and connected allocations also satisﬁes degeneracy. The
formal deﬁnition of connectedness and proofs of suﬃcient conditions and of
degeneracy result are given in the Appendix.
S i m i l a rt ot h ec a s eo ft h ee xa n t ep a i r w i s ec o r en o t i o na b o v ed e g e n e r a c y
allows to simplify the presentation of the ex post pairwise core constraints in
Deﬁnition 2. Given an implementable allocation (p,µ,α,δ),l e tyk
ij denote the
degenerate support of (nonempty) measure µk
ij and let Kk
ij denote the set of all





















for all k0 ∈ Kk
ij,a l lk ∈ Kij such that λ
k
ij > 0,a l lp a i r s(i,j) corresponding to
trade meetings, and where g(x) ≡ u(c−1(x)).
5 The algorithm
Because the beneﬁcial external margin and harmful internal margin eﬀects
of money creation are at balance in any optimum, the optima always have
some binding participation constraints. If the notion of implementability
is the ex ante pairwise core notion, then, if individuals are patient enough,
the optima also have randomization over how much money is transferred in
5Another way to get reassurance about the connectedness restriction is by way of a
description of the set of allocations that are (ex post pairwise core) implementable, but
not connected. They tend to be allocations which do not make full use of the set of
possible money holdings. For example, for B =2 , any non-connected allocation can be
achieved with B =1and two distinct monies (see Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996)
for examples of such allocations).
10meetings. This implies that some of the constraints in (10) are also binding.
Because these constraints are complicated functions of an allocation, closed-
form solutions for the optima are out of reach even for the case of a two-unit
bound on holdings. That is why I compute a set of examples.
The optimization problem P falls within the class of problems generally
referred to as “nonlinear programming problems”, for which many standard
routines are available. However, as one can see, the constraints in (10) are
discontinuous.6 Another diﬃculty is that the mapping F(p) ≡ pTAD− p
is ill-behaved at α = δ =0 .7 This precludes application of routines which
require continuous diﬀerentiability of objective and constraints, such as se-
quential quadratic programming. I overcome this diﬃculty by designing a
hybrid algorithm which combines genetic and conventional smooth optimiza-
tion techniques.
There are three main steps in this algorithm.
• Step 1. Create an initial population of allocations.
• Step 2. Amend the population by replacing the worst allocations by
better ones.
• Step 3. Check if the termination criterion is satisﬁed for the best
allocation in the population. If yes, terminate. If no, return to step 2.
In step 1 I create a matrix where each row is an allocation. Allocations in
the initial population are picked randomly among those which satisfy ex ante
(ex post) individual rationality. The size of the population is a parameter of
the algorithm.
To amend the population in step 2 I use several genetic operators. These
operators are called selection, crossover and mutation. I use standard selec-
tion and crossover operators, a subset of those described in Houck, Joines




















where sign(x) is the sign function, and ϑ
k
ij is a slack variable.
7See Deviatov and Wallace (2001), who study the properties of that mapping for B =2 .
11and Kay (1996). However, I modify the standard mutation operator. The
standard operator alters a single allocation (called “the parent”) to produce
another allocation (called “the child”). The operator I use is a composition
of two independent operators.
The ﬁrst one is applied only if the parent has at least one of the transfer
probabilities λ
k
ij at its upper or lower bound or if it has α = δ =0 .T h e
operator pushes a random subset of these variables into the interior. If a
better allocation is produced, it replaces the parent in the population. This
simple mutation deals with discontinuity of the constraints in (10) and with
ill behavior of the mapping F(p) at zero.
The second operator alters only those of the transfer probabilities and
policy pairs which are already in the interior. There, because all constraints
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, application of smooth methods is possi-
ble. This leaves a range of possibilities for what this second operator can be.
In particular, one can run a few iterations of a sequential quadratic routine
or of the BFGS algorithm8 (as long as these iterations remain in the interior).
The operator I adopt makes use of the gradients in the following way.
First, I compute (reduced) gradients of the objective and of all active
constraints. Then I compute an orthogonal projection of the gradient of the
objective onto the subspace orthogonal to the one spanned by the gradients
of the active constraints. After that I randomly pick a search direction in the
neighborhood (small cone) of that projection. Going in that search direction
is likely to improve the objective and does not violate (at least by much)
the active constraints. The child is obtained from the parent by moving
along the search direction. However, this procedure often leads to violation
of some constraints even if the parent satisﬁes all the constraints. In this
case the objective implied by the child is reduced by some value which is
proportional to the amount by which the constraints are violated. If the
penalty parameter is large, even a small violation is costly, and the child
dies out of the population quickly. If the parent itself violates constraints by
large amounts, then the search direction is chosen to move the child closer to
the feasible region regardless of what happens to the objective. Because the
initial population is chosen randomly, this is important in the beginning of
search. In other words, the second operator ﬁrst pushes allocations towards
satisfaction of the pairwise core conditions; then it drives the population to
the optimum.
8See Judd (1998) for further details.
12The termination criterion in step 3 is based on the ﬁrst order conditions
for the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. If the length of the projection of the gradient
of the objective onto the subspace orthogonal to that spanned by the gradi-
ents of the active constraints is less than the tolerance value, the necessary
conditions for the theorem are (approximately) satisﬁed. Because the prob-
ability of selection of parents in the population is an increasing function of
the objective, this is suﬃcient to guarantee that every terminal point is a
(local) maximum.
6 The examples
I use the above algorithm to compute optima for examples with a two-unit
bound on individual money holdings. I compute three sets of examples. In
all the examples, the utility function, u(x), is xκ; the cost function, c(x), is x;
and the number of specialization types, N,i s3. The examples are computed
for various κ and various degrees of patience, r,w h e r er ≡ 1
β − 1.
There are two things that are common to every example. First, there are
no binding consumer participation constraints. Second, in a meeting of a
producer with no money and a consumer with two units, one unit of money
changes hands with probability one.
H o w e v e r ,t h em o s ti m p o r t a n tﬁnding is that there are no examples where
money creation is beneﬁc i a li ft h ee xa n t ep a i r w i s ec o r ei st h en o t i o no f
implementability, while such examples are easily found if the notion of im-
plementability is the ex post pairwise core. The former may not be merely
coincidental.
Consider an ex ante pairwise core implementable allocation (p,µ,α,δ) ≡
x with (α,δ) > 0. Next, consider another allocation (p0,µ0,α0,δ
0) ≡ x0 with
the same outputs and with α0 < α and δ
0 < δ such that TADand hence p are
unchanged. (One can show that it is suﬃcient to adjust λ
1
11 alone and that
there exists a unique direction in the (α,δ) plane such that x0 remains in the
ex ante pairwise core.) Then x and x0 yield the same welfare. In addition, the
replacement of x by x0 tends to relax producer participation constraints and
to tighten consumer participation constraints. But since the optima tend not
to have binding consumer participation constraints, the replacement tends
to slacken the relevant constraints. Then, if the replacement makes all of
the producer participation constraints be slack, continuity implies that it is
possible to ﬁnd an ex ante pairwise core implementable allocation which is
13better than x. A formal argument along these lines is diﬃcult because it is
diﬃcult to show that the optima do not have binding consumer participation
constraints. (This, however, is not surprising because, as demonstrated in
Berentsen, Molico and Wright (2002), money has no value if the gain from
t r a d ef o rc o n s u m e r si sz e r o . )
I take advantage of these common features to simplify presentation of
examples in the tables below. I omit the probabilities of transfer of money












11). I attach stars (∗) to outputs which correspond
to binding producer participation constraints and daggers (†) to the transfer
probabilities which correspond to binding ﬁrst order constraints in (10).
The ﬁrst two sets of examples are examples of optima with the ex ante
pairwise core notion of implementability. The ﬁrst set shows how optima
change with patience. Here I ﬁx κ = 1
2 and vary r. This choice implies that
the best quantity of output, y∗,i s0.25. I compute examples for all r from 0.01
through 0.25 in increments of 0.01 and for r ∈ {0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5}. Ir e p o r t
a subset of these examples in Table 1. The examples are consistent with the
existence of four diﬀerent regions with respect to the degree of patience r.I f
r is small enough, then the optima have randomization over the transfers of
money in all three trade meetings where transfers of only one unit are feasible.
If r belongs to the second region, the optima have randomization over the
transfers of money only in meetings where the consumers have one unit.
In meetings of producers with one and consumers with two units, money
changes hands with probability one. In the next region the optima have
randomization over the transfers of money in meetings where both producers
and consumers have one unit. Finally, if r is big enough, one unit of money
changes hands with probability one in all trade meetings. The examples are
consistent with the transfer probabilities λ12, λ01,a n dλ11 being decreasing
functions of patience.
In addition, these examples are consistent with the optima having at
most one nonbinding producer participation constraint, the one in meetings
of producers with nothing and consumers with two units of money. In a
meeting of a producer with one unit and a consumer with two, lowering
the probability of handing over money raises v2. That is helpful because it
loosens producer constraint in (i,j)=( 1 ,1) meeting, which, in turn, allows
a decrease in λ11 and, thus, an increase in p1 (and, thereby, in the frequency
of trade). Because λ11 is low, the participation constraint in (i,j)=( 1 ,1)
14meeting is binding and the output is low.
Likewise, a smaller probability of giving up money in (i,j)=( 0 ,1) meet-
ing lowers v0 which helps to relax the producer constraint in (i,j)=( 0 ,2)
meeting. This allows a higher y02 which, again, pushes up v2. This accounts
for why y02 is so high. The same kind of eﬀect on v2 could be achieved with
a positive λ
0
02, but that would reduce λ
1
02 and, hence, the inﬂow into p1.
The second set of examples shows how optima change with risk aversion.
Here I ﬁx r =0 .04 and vary κ.I c o m p u t e e x a m p l e s f o r a l l κ from 0.1
through 0.9 in the increments of 0.1. These examples are reported in Table
2. A general ﬁnding here is that the optima change with κ in a similar way
as they change with patience. In particular, the transfer probabilities λ12,
λ01,a n dλ11 are decreasing functions of risk aversion.
The third set of examples shows optima with the ex ante pairwise core
notion of implementability. I compute examples for all r from 0.01 through
0.2 in increments of 0.01 and for r ∈ {0.25, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1, 2}. Ir e p o r t
some of these examples in Table 3.9 T h ee x a m p l e sa r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
optimal inﬂation rate, α, and the welfare gain from adoption of the optimal
policy being increasing functions of patience. Also, I ﬁnd no examples where
money creation is beneﬁcial and the optima have take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers
in all meetings – the bargaining rule assumed by Molico (1997). Finally,
all optima have transfers of one unit of money with probability one in all
trade meetings. This is consistent with my conjecture that all optima are
connected. I should make it clear that the transfers of one unit are optimal
here because of the two-unit bound on holdings. In environments with larger
bounds one should not expect that the optima will have transfers of one unit,
but, as was argued above, it is plausible that they will be connected.
In Table 4 I present some comparison of the two notions of implementabil-
ity. Note that, even though every allocation which satisﬁes ex post IR satisﬁes
ex ante IR, there is no subset result for the allocations with ex ante and with
ex post pairwise core notions of implementability.10 Nevertheless, the ex
9The ﬁrst three columns show examples of optima where the proof technique of De-
viatov and Wallace (2001) is applicable; the next three columns show examples where
money creation is still beneﬁcial, but the proof technique of Deviatov and Wallace is not
applicable; the next two columns yield examples where money creation is no longer bene-
ﬁcial, but the optima do not have take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by consumers; and the last two
columns yield examples where money creation is not beneﬁcial and where the optima have
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. The last row shows welfare gain compared to the optima subject
to α = δ =0 .
10Examples of ex post pairwise core implementable allocations which fail to satisfy the
15ante notion is in some sense weaker because it allows for randomization over
the amount of money transferred in meetings. This, to some extent, mimics
divisibility of money. With the ex post notion individuals agree to every
realization in the support of randomized trades which makes randomization
costly.
Given that pattern of trade, the only way to enlarge the set of feasible
distributions is by means of the policy which accounts for the beneﬁcial
eﬀects found in Deviatov and Wallace (2001). However, money creation never
allows to achieve distributions which are concentrated around the average
holdings to such an extent as those that are feasible with the ex ante pairwise
core notion. That is why optima with ex ante pairwise core notion yield a
considerably higher welfare (the diﬀerence is shown in the last row of Table
4).
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The results in this paper show that there is a sharp contrast among the
alternative notions of implementability. If the ex post pairwise core is the
notion of implementability, then money creation can be beneﬁcial, whereas
w i t ht h ee xa n t ep a i r w i s ec o r en o t i o nt h e r ea r en oe x a m p l e sw h e r ep o s i t i v e
money creation is optimal. This disparity is due entirely to the distinction
between committing or not committing to randomization. The disparity is
interesting because as the bound on individual money holdings gets large,
randomization plays a smaller and smaller role and, in the limit, no role.
Then, the two notions of implementability coincide. The uniformity of the
numerical ﬁnding of no beneﬁcial money creation using the ex ante pairwise
core notion leads me to surmise that it is the general result that will survive
in the limit.
The latter (if correct) needs to be reconciled with a list of existing mod-
els with divisible money in which money creation can be beneﬁcial (Imro-
horoglu (1992), Levine (1991), Kehoe, Levine and Woodford (1992), and
Molico (1997)). These are models where either competitive outcomes or par-
ticular bargaining rules are used as the notions of implementability. The
outcomes, therefore, are proper subsets of the (ex ante) pairwise core. These
models may give rise to a beneﬁcial role for money creation through extensive
ﬁrst order conditions for ex ante pairwise core include the best allocations under no policy
described in Deviatov and Wallace (2001).
16margin eﬀects, because they impose a priori a smaller set of within-meeing
(intensive margin) outcomes.
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198 Appendix
Here I show degeneracy of conditional measures µk
ij for the case of the ex
post pairwise core notion of implementability. As I said, I use an argument
which is based on perturbations of candidates for the optima. To apply
that method, I need the candidates to be internal because otherwise they
can not be perturbed and remain implementable. To assure satisfaction of
this condition, I consider a subset of implementable allocations – those that
satisfy a property I call connectedness. In this section I prove that every
optimum over the set of ex post IR implementable and connected allocation
satisﬁes degeneracy. This, in turn, implies that degeneracy holds for the
optima over the smaller set of all ex post pairwise core implementable and
connected allocations. Note that with connectedness restriction degeneracy
holds for all feasible policies. That is why, to simplify the notation, I proceed
with zero money creation in this section.
I start with the formal deﬁnition of connectedness. Let (p,µ) be an arbi-
trary allocation. Let G(p,µ) be the set of all pairs (i,j), i being the producer’s
holdings and j the consumer’s holdings, such that agents are willing to trade
one unit of money. That is:
G(p,µ) = {(i,j):∃ y ∈ R+ such that vi+1 − vi ≥ c(y) and u(y) ≥ vj − vj−1}
(A1)
Next, I use G(p,µ) to deﬁne a correspondence Ξ(p,µ) on the set of money
holdings of producers, I ≡{0,...,B − 1}, which gives the post-trade holdings
of consumers implied by G(p,µ).T h a ti s :
Ξ(p,µ)(i)=
©
j − 1:( i,j) ∈ G(p,µ)
ª
Next, let a subset Il of I be called a block if the restriction of Ξ(p,µ) to Il×Il,
denoted Ξl
(p,µ),11 admits a selection, denoted σl
(p,µ), which is a permutation






Ξ(p,µ)(i) ∩ Il if i ∈ Il
∅ otherwise .
12Let σ : A → A be a permutation and let R be an equivalence relation on A such
that anRam if and only if there exists an integer l such that am = σl(an).T h e na no r b i t
20is possible to ﬁnd a sequence of blocks {Ils}
m−1
s=n such that Ils ∩ Ils+1 6= ∅ for
all s = n,...,m − 1. I can now give the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition A1. An allocation (p,µ) is said to be connected if there ex-
ists a collection {Ils}
m
s=1 of blocks such that every block in this collection is




As I said, two simple conditions are suﬃcient for connectedness: (i) (p,µ)
implies a concave value function v and p has full support; and (ii) trade
occurs in all meetings where the consumer is at least as rich as the producer.
I now prove suﬃciency of these conditions.
Lemma A1. If (p,µ) is ex post IR implementable and is such that
(i) p has full support and the associated value function v is concave and
(ii) λ
k
ij > 0 for some k ≥ 1 in all meetings in which j ≥ i, where j is
money holdings of the consumer and i those of the producer, then (p,µ) is
connected.
Proof. First, I show that concavity of the value function implies that
trade in a meeting implies willingness to trade one unit in that meeting.
Because (p,µ) is ex post IR implementable and p has full support, λ
k
ij > 0











≥ u(y) ≥ vj − vj−k ≥ k(vj − vj−1)
where in each display the second inequality follows from implementability.
The outer inequalities imply willingness to trade
y
k for one unit of money.
Therefore, by hypothesis (ii) of the lemma, G(p,µ) contains all pairs of
money holdings (i,j) with j ≥ i.N o w f o r e a c h i ∈ {1,...,B − 1} consider
the set Ii ≡ {i − 1,i}. T h i si sab l o c kb e c a u s ej = i +1and j = i satisfy
j ≥ i and because the associated permutation, σi
(p,µ) =
µ




of σ is an equivalence class of relation R. Note that an arbitrary permutation can have
more than one orbit. However, if a permutation has a unique orbit, this orbit necessarily
coincides with the set A.
21has a unique orbit. Finally, these blocks are mutually reachable and jointly
cover the set {0,...,B − 1} of money holdings of producers. ¥
Now I would like to introduce some additional notation which is used
later. If (p,µ) is ex post IR implementable and connected, then there are
participation constraints implied by both actual trades in meetings and by
willingness to trade one unit of money. In particular, implementability im-
plies that if the probability of a transfer of k units of money in a meeting
of a producer with i and a consumer with j units, pipjλ
k
ij, is positive, then
the participation constraints (7) have to hold for every y i nt h es u p p o r to f
conditional measure µk
ij. Connectedness implies that another group of par-
ticipation constraints holds for some y in every meeting where agents are
willing to trade one unit of money. Therefore, it is convenient to deﬁne the
following objects:
Deﬁnition A2. Given an arbitrary implementable and connected allo-
cation (p,µ),d e ﬁne
Z
1





and Z(p,µ) ≡ Z1
(p,µ) ∪ Z2
(p,µ).
Next, observe that if some triplet (i,j,1) is in Z1




ij =0and the associated conditional measure, µ1
ij,i se m p t y . I t
is convenient to replace this empty measure by one with a support whose
lower endpoint is positive. Moreover, this replacement is innocuous because
pipjλ
1
ij =0which implies that the ﬁctitious support does not aﬀect v or W.
Accordingly, for every (i,j,1) ∈ Z1
(p,µ)\Z2
(p,µ),l e tµ1
ij be a Dirac measure with
support y,w h e r ey is any suitable output in the deﬁnition of G(p,µ).
Now, let yk
ij and yk
ij denote the endpoints of the support of measure µk
ij
with the above replacement of empty measures in Z1
(p,µ)\Z2
(p,µ). Then, we
have the following. If (p,µ) is ex post IR implementable and connected, then
c(y
k
ij) − (vi+k − vi) ≤ 0 and (vj − vj−k) − u(y
k
ij) ≤ 0 (A2)
hold for all (i,j,k) ∈ Z(p,µ).
I now concentrate on the optimum problem P0, which is to maximize
welfare W subject to (p,µ) being ex post IR implementable and connected.
First I use connectedness to show that P0 h a ss o l u t i o n s . T h i si sd o n eb y
22endowing the space of measures µk
ij with the weak* topology and by showing
that the set of the ex post IR implementable and connected allocations is
compact and that the objective W is continuous.
Proposition A1. The optimum problem P0 has solutions.
Proof. To see that the set of the ex post IR implementable and connected
allocations, Γ, is nonempty, observe that autarky is always in Γ.T h ef a c tt h a t
suppµk
ij = {0} for all nonempty measures µk
ij in µ implies that the associated
value function, v, is zero and money has no value. Then, because y =0
satisﬁes participation constraints for all i, j, k, autarky is implementable
and connected.
To demonstrate compact valuedness of Γ,i ts u ﬃces to show that Γ is
closed valued and that all of the supports of measures µk
ij are bounded13.C o n -
sider a converging net of implementable and connected allocations, (p,µ)r,









ij for all i, j, k. This and continuity of the function g(p,λ) ≡
pT − p imply that pT = p and the limiting distribution p is stationary.
To show that the limit (p,µ) is ex post IR implementable and con-
nected, let us ﬁrst consider all converging nets (p,µ)r such that starting












and because vr → v, all participation constraints in (A2)
hold in the limit, and (p,µ) is ex post IR implementable and connected.
To see that the constancy of Z(p,µ)r is without loss of generality, consider
an arbitrary converging net (p,µ)r.B e c a u s ef o re v e r yr, Z(p,µ)r is a subset
of {0,...,B − 1}×{ 1,...,B}2,w h i c hi sﬁnite, there exists some set Z and a
subnet (p,µ)rs with the property that Z(p,µ)rs = Z. Then, because a net
converges if and only if every subnet converges to the same limit, (p,µ),t h e
constancy of Z(p,µ)r is without loss of generality.
To demonstrate boundedness of supports, let us consider an arbitrary
block Il and write down incentive compatibility constraints (A2), which per-




ij) ≤ vi+1 − vi,a n dv j − vj−1 ≤ u(y
1
ij)
13Recall that if topology on the space of probability measures P(X) is the weak* topol-
ogy, then P(X) is compact if and only if X is compact.
23all i ∈ Il. Because σl
(p,µ) is a permutation and selection from Ξ(p,µ),f o re a c h
j, which shows up in the above collection of the participation constraints, it
is possible to ﬁnd a unique i such that j−1=σl
(p,µ)(i).A d d i n gu ps e p a r a t e l y




















(p,µ) is a permutation, the two sums of gains from trade in (A3)

















Note that by deﬁnition, yk
ij ≤ yk
ij, which, together with the properties of













≤ (|Il| − 1)[u(y
∗) − c(y
∗)],
all i ∈ Il,w h e r ey∗ is a unique solution to u0(y)=c0(y) and |Il|, |Il| ≤ B,i s
the size of block Il. Then, properties of u(y) and c(y) guarantee that y1
ij is
ﬁnite for all i ∈ Il and, because Il is arbitrary, all supports that correspond to
t r a n s f e ro fo n eu n i ta n da r eap a r to fs o m eσl
(p,µ) are bounded. Boundedness
of all other supports follows immediately from consumer constraints in (A2),
from vn − vm =
n−m P
l=1
(vn−l+1 − vn−l) and ∪
l
Il = I, and from free disposal of
money.
Finally, recall that u(y) and c(y) are continuous. Because the supports,
Ωk
ij, are bounded and because each of the spaces of probability measures µij
on R+ ×K ij is endowed with the weak* topology, continuity of the objective
W is immediate. ¥
Then, I deﬁne two classes of perturbations of non-autarkic probability
measures in µ, one class for nondegenerate measures and another for de-
generate ones. A measure µk
ij is called autarkic if it has zero support (i.e.
suppµk
ij = {0}). (An allocation is autarkic if all the nonempty measures µk
ij
are autarkic.) Note that autarky is deﬁn e da sn op r o d u c t i o nr a t h e rt h a n
no trade. The perturbations adjust measure µk
ij, but do not aﬀect λ
k
ij and,
24hence, the distribution p. Note that the perturbations do not aﬀect policy
parameters α and δ (which I set equal to zero in this section) as well. This
is important because it accounts for why degeneracy holds for all feasible
policies.
Let µ be a nondegenerate probability measure on R+ with a bounded
support and let y and y b et h ee n d p o i n t so ft h a ts u p p o r t . L e tu st a k es i x
nonnegative numbers: a, b, c, d, x and ε such that b ≥ a+
y−y
2 , d ≥ c+
y−y
2 ,
min(a,c) ≤ x ≤ max(b,d) and 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Also, let us observe that µ can
be tautologically written as µ = µ1 + µ2,w h e r eµ1 = µ2 = 1
2µ.T h e n t h e
perturbation does two things. First, it moves the endpoints y and y of µ1 and
µ2 independently to the new positions, a and b for µ1 and c and d for µ2,s o
that the ”shapes” of µ1 and µ2 (which are those of µ) are preserved. Second,
the perturbation creates a mass point x with mass ε within the union of the




















where δx is a Dirac measure with support x,a n dt1 and t2 are two linear
mappings on the real line deﬁn e db ym yr e q u i r e m e n tt h a tt1 maps y and y
into a and b and that t2 maps y and y into c and d.14 Note that because I
set b>aand d>c ,t h em a p p i n g st1 and t2 are invertible.
For a measure µ which is degenerate, the perturbation splits its single-
point support into two points which, however, are allowed to be the same.
Each of these points gets one-half of the mass of measure µ.T h a ti s ,l e tg









Now, given an arbitrary implementable and connected allocation (p,µ),I
deﬁne a ﬁnite-dimensional optimization problem, denoted e P(p,µ),w h i c hi st o









one eight-tuple for each nonempty non-autarkic measure µk









and analogously for t2.
25(p, e µ) being implementable and connected. If (p,µ) solves P0, then the null
perturbation must solve e P(p,µ).T h i si st h eb a s i sf o rt h ep r o o fb yc o n t r a d i c -
tion showing that every nonempty non-autarkic measure µk
ij in µ must be
degenerate.
Because this optimization problem is ﬁnite-dimensional, it can be an-
alyzed by means of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. The central hypothesis of
that theorem is the constraint qualiﬁcation: the rank of the Jacobian matrix
should be equal to the number of active constraints. The constraint quali-
ﬁcation is suﬃc i e n tt oe n s u r et h ee x i s t e n c eo fa no p e nr e g i o nU adjacent to
the solution point in which all the constraints are relaxed. Existence of such
a region allows one to claim that the solution point satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
necessary conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. My approach is to estab-
lish existence of U directly, without appeal to the full rank requirement on
the Jacobian matrix.
Lemma A2. Let (p,µ) be a non-autarkic solution to problem P0. Let
e P∗
(p,µ) be the associated perturbation problem e P(p,µ) with the additional restric-
tion that εk
ij ≡ 0. Let E be the set of all active constraints of problem e P∗
(p,µ)
at (p,µ) and assume that E is nonempty. Then there exists a nonempty
subset E0 of E and multipliers ξs ≥ 0, one for each constraint in E0, such
that the gradient of the objective W can be written as a linear combination
of the gradients of the constraints in E0.
Proof. By assumption, (p,µ) is non-autarkic, ex post IR implementable
and connected. I ﬁrst show that yk
ij > 0 for all (i,j,k) ∈ Z(p,µ). Suppose
to the contrary, that there exists a triplet (i,j,k) ∈ Z(p,µ) such that yk
ij =
0. By (A2), it follows that in this case vj − vj−k =0 , which implies that
vj −vj−1 =0 . Because (p,µ) is connected, there exists a block, Il,s u c ht h a t
j − 1 ∈ Il.T h e nvj − vj−1 =0implies that y1
i1j1 =0 ,w h e r ei1 = j − 1 and
j1 = σl
(p,µ)(i1)+1 .F r o m y1
i1j1 =0it follows that y1
i1j1 =0 , which implies






for m =1 ,2,....B e c a u s eσl
(p,µ) has a unique orbit, which spans the block Il,
the process will cycle at m = |Il| ≤ B,a n dt h e nvi+1 − vi =0for all i ∈ Il.
Note that this implies that no production takes place in return for one unit
of money in meetings which pertain to permutation σl
(p,µ).
26If two blocks Il1 and Il2 overlap and one of the two has yk
ij =0 , then
vi+1 − vi =0for all i ∈ Il1 ∪ Il2. Finally, because connectedness requires
that every block is reachable from any other and because these blocks jointly
cover I, the value function v is zero. That, in turn, implies that (p,µ) is
autarkic, a contradiction.
I now construct a vector n whose inner product with the gradients of
the constraints in problem e P∗
(p,µ) is positive. The vector n is obtained by
stacking vectors lk
ij, one for each (i,j,k) ∈ Z(p,µ). The construction of lk
ij
diﬀers depending on whether µk
ij is or is not degenerate.
Let us ﬁrst consider a nondegenerate measure µk
ij. Without loss of gen-




ij. Then the 4 × 2 block of the
Jacobian matrix which corresponds to the perturbation of µk










































       

. (A6)
Now let us take some vector l ≡ (−la,l b,l c,l d) ∈ R4. The scalar products

































































To show that such a choice of l is possible, let us ﬁrst write out the





































































































Observe that because µk
ij is nondegenerate, all four integrals in (A9) are
strictly positive. Then, because the expected cost of production for producer
and the expected utility of consumption for consumer show up only in the






























Notice that lc = la and lb = −ld is a solution, which implies that la > 0 and
ld > 0 is possible.
If measure µk


































































28Obviously, lg = lh =1satisﬁes this equation.
T h u s ,w eh a v et h ev e c t o rn whose inner product with the gradients of
the constraints in problem e P∗
(p,µ) is positive. Because the objective and
constraints are continuously diﬀerentiable, existence of n is equivalent to
e x i s t e n c eo fa no p e nr e g i o nU in the space of perturbations where all the
constraints in (A2) are relaxed. Because (p,µ) solves P0, it follows that the
gradient of the objective is in the convex hull of the gradients of the active
constraints. Finally, because the number of constraints in (A2) does not ex-
ceed the number of degrees of freedom provided by perturbations, the edges
of that convex hull are linearly independent. ¥
The multipliers ξs of Lemma A2 can be used to prove the main proposi-
tion.




Proof. Suppose that (p,µ) is a solution to the optimum problem P0
and that it has at least one nondegenerate measure µk
ij. Consider the associ-
ated perturbation problem e P(p,µ) and let E be the set of active participation
constraints of that problem. Let us ﬁrst assume that E is nonempty.
By Lemma A2, (p,µ) satisﬁes necessary ﬁrst order conditions for the
Kuhn-Tucker theorem for that problem. The constraints are the participation
constraints in E0 and εk




ij =0 , the multipliers
associated with xk
ij are equal to zero. Therefore, the multiplier associated
with the binding constraint, εk


























where ξs1 and ξs2 are the multipliers from Lemma A2.
Note that optimality of εk








































the multipliers ξs1 and ξs2 are well-deﬁned, Φ(y) is a continuous function.
Moreover, Φ(y) is non-constant because u(y) and c(y) are linearly indepen-
dent and because ξs1 and ξs2 can, without loss of generality, be independently
scaled. Then, because µk
ij is a nondegenerate probability measure, straight-
forward application of the ﬁrst mean value theorem for the Lebesgue integral












ij.T h i s








If E is empty, then all the participation constraints are slack which implies
that the multipliers associated with these constraints are zeros. Then Φ(y)=
z(y) and the above argument applies. ¥
Note that the proof of Proposition A2 applies to any non-autarkic solution
to problem P0. Recall that autarky is an allocation where all nonempty
measures µk
ij have zero supports and, thus, is degenerate. This means that
Proposition A2 holds for all possible solutions to problem P0. However, if
P r o p o s i t i o nA 2i st ob eo fi n t e r e s t ,i tb e t t e rb et h a tt h e r ei saw i d ec l a s so f
environments where these solutions are non-autarkic. It is easy to provide
conditions for existence of non-autarkic implementable allocations. These
exist if c0(0) < 1
(
1
β−1)N+1u0(0).15 Then if, as was argued above, connectedness
is an innocuous restriction for problem P, then this condition is also suﬃcient
for existence of non-autarkic solutions to problem P0.
15This condition is suﬃcient for existence of non-autarkic implementable allocations in
which the support of p is {0,B}, trades are limited to transfers of B units of money in
meetings of producers with zero and consumers with B units, and in which consumers
make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to producers.




r 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p0 .2181 .2704 .2938 .3023 .3286 .3570 .3645 .4242 .4635 .4830
p1 .5884 .4974 .4566 .4466 .4226 .3998 .3951 .3573 .3303 .3135
p2 .1935 .2322 .2496 .2511 .2488 .2432 .2404 .2185 .2062 .2035
λ01 .2023† .4143† .5774† .6291† .7820† .9884† 1 1 1 1
λ12 .3357† .6763† .9478† 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ11 .1218† .2537† .3516† .3804† .4577† .5432† .5613† .7259† .8761† 1
y01 .25∗ .25∗ .25∗ .25∗ .25∗ .25∗ .2408∗ .1585∗ .1136∗ .0844∗
y12 .25∗ .25∗ .25∗ .2401∗ .1870∗ .1390∗ .1301∗ .0730∗ .0452∗ .0293∗
y11 .0908∗ .0938∗ .0927∗ .0913∗ .0855∗ .0755∗ .0730∗ .0529∗ .0395∗ .0293∗
y02 .6876 .5306 .4331∗ .3974∗ .3196∗ .2529∗ .2408∗ .1585∗ .1136∗ .0844∗
Note that for r =0 .01 the set of binding ﬁrst order constraints (10) includes binding inequality constraint
for λ1
02 w h i c hi sn o ts h o w ni nt h et a b l e .
31Table 2: Optima with the ex ante pairwise core notion of implementability.
u(x)=xκ.
κ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p0 .1357 .1845 .2148 .2357 .2510 .2623 .2727 .3243 .4796
p1 .7593 .6703 .6114 .5682 .5343 .5067 .4812 .4268 .3572
p2 .1050 .1452 .1738 .1961 .2147 .2310 .2461 .2489 .1632
λ01 .0300† .0803† .1457† .2232† .3108† .4058† .5180† .8995† 1
λ12 .1622† .2618† .3514† .4331† .5103† .5821† .6640† 1 1
λ11 .0247† .0596† .0998† .1432† .1888† .2359† .2898† .4430† .6134†
y01 .0744∗ .1337∗ .1791∗ .2172∗ .2500∗ .2789∗ .3046∗ .3277∗ .1624∗
y12 .0744∗ .1337∗ .1791∗ .2172∗ .2500∗ .2789∗ .3046∗ .3051∗ .1411∗
y11 .0118∗ .0305∗ .0509∗ .0717∗ .0925∗ .1130∗ .1330∗ .1352∗ .0866∗
y02 .4792 .5326 .5549 .5726 .5859 .5969 .5881∗ .3645∗ .1624∗
The best quantity of output varies with κ. In the table the best quantity is equal to y01 for all κ except
κ =0 .9 for which this quantity equals 0.3487.




r 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.25
α .0946 .0709 .0555 .0480 .0258 .0045 0 0 0 0
δ .0623 .0474 .0374 .0325 .0177 .0031 0 0 0 0
p0 .3319 .3353 .3377 .3389 .3426 .3465 .3487 .3563 .3634 .4094
p1 .3616 .3551 .3506 .3484 .3416 .3346 .3331 .3328 .3324 .3279
p2 .3065 .3096 .3117 .3127 .3158 .3189 .3182 .3109 .3042 .2627
λ01 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
y01 .2570 .2574 .2576 .2577 .2580 .2583 .2607 .2719 .2609∗ .1853∗
y12 .1954∗ .1940∗ .1930∗ .1924∗ .1902∗ .1875∗ .1826∗ .1612∗ .1505∗ .0919∗
y11 .1954∗ .1940∗ .1930∗ .1924∗ .1902∗ .1875∗ .1826∗ .1612∗ .1505∗ .0919∗
y02 .3041∗ .2993∗ .2963∗ .2949∗ .2907∗ .2866∗ .2838∗ .2729∗ .2609∗ .1853∗
∆W
W 3.27% 2.29% 1.62% 1.27% 0.49% 0.04% 0% 0% 0% 0%
33Table 4: Optima with ex ante versus optima with ex post pairwise core
notions of implementability.
r 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.25
α .0866 0 .0555 0 .0258 0 0 0 0 0
δ .0573 0 .0374 0 .0177 0 0 0 0 0
p0 .3330 .2310 .3377 .2649 .3424 .2857 .3525 .3286 .4094 .3979
p1 .3595 .5678 .3506 .5084 .3416 .4680 .3330 .4226 .3279 .3744
p2 .3075 .2012 .3117 .2267 .3158 .2463 .3145 .2488 .2627 .2277
λ01 1 .2385† 1 .3802† 1 .5244† 1 .7820† 1 1
λ12 1 .3948† 1 .6217† 1 .8572† 1 1 1 1
λ11 1 .1441† 1 .2323† 1 .3211† 1 .4577† 1 .6262†
y01 .2572 .25∗ .2576 .25∗ .2580 .25∗ .2667 .25∗ .1853∗ .1927∗
y12 .1950∗ .25∗ .1930∗ .25∗ .1902∗ .25∗ .1715∗ .1870∗ .0919∗ .0959∗
y11 .1950∗ .0913∗ .1930∗ .0934∗ .1902∗ .0937∗ .1715∗ .0855∗ .0919∗ .0619∗
y02 .3025∗ .6473 .2963∗ .5459 .2907∗ .4763∗ .2783∗ .3196∗ .1853∗ .1927∗
∆W
W 19.5% 14.2% 11.2% 7.62% 3.22%
For each value of r the ﬁrst column shows the optimum with ex post and the second column shows the
optimum with ex ante pairwise core notions of implementability. The last row shows welfare improvement
relative to optima with ex post pairwise core notion of implementability.
34